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Esports Corruption: Gambling, Doping, and
Global Governance
JOHN T. HOLDEN, RYAN M. RODENBERG & ANASTASIOS KABURAKIS1†

ABSTRACT
The world of esports is fast becoming a mainstream
form of competition and entertainment. While there is
debate over whether esports should be recognized as a
sport, the emergence of competitive video gaming has
seen a rise in many of the problems associated with
traditional sport including: doping, gambling-related
match-fixing and non-gambling related corruption.
Indeed, the esports gambling market has quickly
surpassed the total legal sports wagering market in the
United States, including daily fantasy sports. This
paper examines esports growth and the evolving
integrity challenges being faced by players, tournament
organizers, gamblers, sponsors, politicians, and fans.
Esports, like traditional sports, faces both internal and
external corruption-related threats. Internal threats
facing competitive video gaming include the use of
performance-enhancing drugs and match-fixing. The
industry also faces external pressure from a large
gambling industry that exists in both regulated and
unregulated markets. The entire esports ecosystem is
now facing increased scrutiny from various
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governments who have expressed concerns about how
to regulate the games, and the vast derivative markets.
“Instead of trying to make them traditional sports bettors, we’re
giving them their own playground.”
– Kasper Nemeth, Danske Spil’s esports manager2
INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2016, Bloomberg Businessweek published an article
titled, “Virtual Weapons Are Turning Teen Gamers into Serious
Gamblers.”3 For many readers, the article marked their first
introduction to the game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive or CS:GO,
as it is commonly referred to online.4 It was reported by Brustein and
Novy-Williams that a tournament in Columbus, Ohio had generated
more than 71 million online views in four days.5 In addition to adding
CS:GO to the mainstream vernacular, the Bloomberg article also
introduced readers to the concept of skins gambling.6 In August 2015,
a report issued by Eilers Research projected that esports wagering
would reach $23.5 billion by the year 2020.7

2. Eben Novy-Williams, Legal Sports Books Get Ready for Billions in E-Sports Betting,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2016, 12:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0826/legal-sports-books-get-ready-for-billions-in-e-sports-betting.
3. Joshua Brustein & Eben Novy-Williams, Virtual Weapons Are Turning Teen Gamers
Into
Serious
Gamblers,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr.
20,
2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-virtual-guns-counterstrike-gambling/. See also
Shaun
Assael,
Skin
in
the
Game,
ESPN
(Jan.
20,
2017),
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/18510975/how-counter-strike-turned-teenagercompulsive-gambler.
4. Id.
5. Id. Comparatively, more fans tuned in – online – to watch the 2014 League of
Legends world championship final, 27 million worldwide, than the respective year’s World
Series (23.5 million), NBA Finals (17.9 million), and Stanley Cup finals (6 million); twitch.tv,
whence most gaming video feeds are streamed, was sold to Amazon in 2014 for just under a
billion dollars, and generates more online traffic than ESPN, MLB, and WWE.com combined.
See Stephanie Apstein, E-sports nation: How competitive gaming became a flourishing sport,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2015/10/29/esportscompetitive-video-gaming.
6. Id. Sarkar defined a skin as: “an alternate outfit of some kind, whether for a character
or item. In the particular context of Counter-Strike: Global Offensive, a skin — also known as
a “finish” — is a unique visual design for a weapon, whether it’s a firearm or a knife.” Samit
Sarkar, How do Counter-Strike Global Offensive skins work, POLYGON (July 11, 2016, 10:30
AM), http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/11/12129136/counter-strike-global-offensive-cs-goskins-explainer.
7. Chris Grove & Adam Krejcik, eSports Betting: It’s Real, and Bigger Than You Think,
EILERS RESEARCH (Aug. 19, 2015). For comparison the size of Nevada’s legal sports gambling
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In 2013, Professor Dan Burk called the rise of video gaming “one
of the most astounding and largely underappreciated developments
accompanying the recent proliferation of mass-market computer
technology.”8 Burk highlighted the unique feature of video gaming
whereby player performances are represented by digital depictions, as
opposed to the traditional broadcast model where video of actual
human beings is projected onto television screens.9 Burk noted that
esports are a representative title that encompasses a wide-variety of
sub-groups of games, ranging from sports games with popular titles,
including “FIFA football (soccer),” first-person shooter games with
games such as Counter-Strike and what Burk terms real-time strategy
games, including the game StarCraft.10 While esports is somewhat
nascent to the North American audience in 2017, Comerford noted that
in South Korea the StarCraft competitive video gaming competitions
emerged from the 1990s financial crisis.11 Comerford reported that the
South Korean esports infrastructure for StarCraft II is run through
GomTV, the designated broadcast partner for Blizzard Entertainment
(the maker of StarCraft and StarCraft II), in South Korea.12
Hollist noted in 2014 that crowds, upwards of 40,000 people,
were attending certain esports world championships.13 That same year,
Hollist observed that the massive interest in esports had drawn the
market was estimated to be $4.2 billion in 2015. Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Took
Record $4.2 Billion in Wagers In 2015, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 4, 2016 11:14 AM),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7902/nevada-record-sports-betting-2015/. In 2014, RAND
estimated that the size of the heroin market in the United States was $27 billion. Beau Kilmer
et al., How Big is the U.S. Market for Illegal Drugs?, RAND CORP. (2014),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9770.html. For comparison to a prominent legal
activity, in 2015 the global market value for recorded music was $15 billion. Hugh McIntyre,
For The First Time In 20 Years, The Global Music Industry Gained Ground in 2015, FORBES
(Apr. 13, 2016, 8:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2016/04/13/for-thefirst-time-in-20-years-the-global-music-industry-gained-ground-in-2015/#47a7745a6b1a.
8. Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights In Professional Computer
Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (2013).
9. See generally, Id.
10. Id. at 1538.
11. Sean Comerford, International Intellectual Property Rights and the Future of Global
“E-Sports”, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 623, 628 (2012), citing Kristie Lu Stout, StarCraft II Shakes
up S. Korea’s ‘National Sport’, CNN TECH: DIGITAL BIZ (July 27, 2010, 5:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/gaming.gadgets/07/27/south.korea.starcraft.
12. Id. at 631.
13. Katherine E. Hollist, Time to be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming: The Rising
eSports Industry and the Need for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 824 (2015) citing Paul
Tassi, 40,000 Korean Fans Watch SSW Win 2014 ‘League of Legends’ World Championship,
FORBES
(Oct.
19,
2014,
11:53
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/10/19/40000-live-korean-fans-watch-ssw-win2014-league-of-legends-world-championship/#74a43e105a6d.
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attention of both Sony and Microsoft who sought to enter the esports
world by launching their own esports leagues.14 Hollist argued that the
current esports structure offers minimal protection to the contestants,
including some who may be as young as fourteen years of age. 15 The
competitive nature of professional esports has led some players to seek
advantages from focus-enhancing nootropics including Adderall, and
subsequently led to the implementation of drug testing in one major
league.16 Seo argued that esports has “emerged as a distinct consumerdriven segment within the larger market for computer games,” noting
that esports growth has been a collaboration between companies
reacting to stakeholder groups, including consumers and esports
organizers.17 Projections estimate a global esports audience reaching
over 420 million people in 2019, with direct revenue growing to over
a billion dollars within the same timeframe.18 Approximately 61% of
the U.S. population, 194 million, currently engage in some form of
gaming.19 While game manufacturers may be responding to demands
14. Id. at 829 citing Eddie Makuch, Microsoft Announces Halo eSports League, GAMESPOT
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/microsoft-announces-halo-esportsleague/1100- 6423409/; and Vikki Blake, Sony Launches Esports League on Playstation 4,
IGN (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.ign.com/articles/2014/10/15/sony-launches-esports-leagueonplaystation-4; see also Samuel Lingle, Sony Embraces esports with PlayStation Official
League, THE DAILY DOT (Oct 15, 2014 2:13PM), http://www.dailydot.com/esports/sonyplaystation-official-league/.
15. Hollist, supra note 12 at 831. The risk of exploitation and other dangers child athletes
are exposed to have been well documented in numerous other sports. See Ricardo Gentzsch,
Transfer of Adolescents, 9 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. PANDEKTIS 108 (2011); see also Jean Claude
Mbvoumin, Which Protection for Minors in the 21st Century Football, PLAY THE GAME
(2015), http://www.playthegame.org/media/4162541/28-10-900-Wednesday-Jean-ClaudeMbvoumin.pdf; see also Samuel O. Reglado, “Latin Players on the Cheap:” Professional
Baseball Recruitment in Latin America and the Neocolonialist Tradition, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 9 (2000); Michael S. Schmidt, Dominicans Try Shots to Boost Rising Players,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/sports/baseball/25dominican.html?_r=0.
16. Hollist, supra note 12 at 833; see also Brett Molina, Key eSports Group to Create
Policy
on
PEDs,
USA
TODAY
(July
23,
2015
1:57
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/gaming/2015/07/23/esports-drug-testing/30560219.
Contrary to skill specificity in mainstream sport, professional gamers may have to learn a new
game at regular intervals and depending on competition and prize trends, thus rendering the
pressure toward attention-enhancing medication more prevalent. E.g., Tom Pitt Professional
video gaming is a uniquely demanding sport. We need more than a drugs crackdown to fix it,
INDEP. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/professional-video-gaming-isa-uniquely-demanding-sport-we-need-more-than-a-drugs-crackdown-to-fix-10460201.html.
17. Yuri Seo, Electronic Sports: A New Marketing Landscape of the Experience
Economy, 29 J. MKTG. MGMT. 1542, 1555 (2013).
18. Henry Young, Seven-figure salaries, sold-out stadiums: Is pro video gaming a
sport?, CNN (May 31, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/31/sport/esports-isprofessional-gaming-a-sport/.
19. Id.
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of various stakeholders, other business developers have emerged to fill
the demands of consumers that the video game and esports
manufacturers are unable or unwilling to fill directly. With the
increasing popularity of esports and its emergence into the mainstream,
the dark side of esports and derivative game product gambling is being
illuminated.
Internationally, the markets of South Korea and China are the
most established internationally representing 23% of global revenues
in 2016.20 South Korea has historically dominated the competitive
practice of esports, but has also been a front-runner in regards to
government recognition and regulation of the industry.21 Current
forecasts envision a near future with esports becoming a truly global
enterprise with a viewing audience of 435 million people by 2019. 22
The growth is being partially fueled by a rise in interest in both North
America and Europe. In Europe, both France and Great Britain have
launched governing bodies, which represent an important step towards
sustainable growth and the development of political capital.23 While
esports are growing on national levels, their growth in complementary
transnational markets, such as the betting market and specifically skins
wagering, is partially responsible for the rapid ascension to mainstream
recognition.24
I.

ESPORTS GAMBLING

The esports world has positioned itself along the side of other

20. See Global Esports Market Report: Revenues to Jump to $463M in 2016 as US Leads
the Way, NEWZOO (Jan. 25, 2016), https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/global-esportsmarket-report-revenues-to-jump-to-463-million-in-2016-as-us-leads-the-way/.
21. South Korea launched the first team-based esports league, the StarCraft ProLeague
in 2003; the league ran until 2016, when it was announced that the league would cease
operations, in part as a result of ongoing problems with match-fixing. See Brian Ashcraft, The
End of an Era for StarCraft and South Korea, KOTAKU (Oct. 18, 2016 6:10AM),
http://kotaku.com/the-end-of-an-era-for-starcraft-and-south-korea-1787917075.
22. See The Explosive Growth of Esports and Why It Matters to Everyone, NEWZOO
(2016), available at: http://cga.global/research/CGA_Newzoo_Esports_Growth_2016.pdf.
23. Peter Lewin & Jas Purewal, Esports Predictions: Great Growth in 2016, Storm
Clouds
for
2017,
GAMESINDUSTRY
(Jan.
15,
2016),
http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2016-12-15-esports-predictions-great-growth-in2016-storm-clouds-for-2017.
24. Joss Wood, New Report: Esports Audience Could Almost Double to 600 Million by
2020, With Big Growth for Esports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 22, 2017 11:44 AM),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/13132/esports-betting-and-audience-growth2020/?utm_content=bufferfdb5d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_cam
paign=buffer.
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major sports organizations through sponsorships and partnerships with
a wide variety of recognizable brands including: Coca Cola,
McDonald’s, Arby’s, Nissan, Red Bull, FritoLay, and technology
companies well aligned with esports such as Intel, Microsoft, Sony,
and Google/YouTube.25 While moving towards sponsorships with
mainstream enterprises like other sports leagues, the esports world has
also given rise to a lucrative gambling market, much like traditional
mainstream sports.26 Robins noted that while the gambling market on
esports is meaningful in size, it is dominated by a few entities.27 Robins
further noted that there is not one entity that has cornered the market
across various esports titles, with the esports gambling market still
developing.28 Robins observed that in connection with real currencies
being wagered on esports matches there is also a market for virtual
items to be wagered.29
The market for virtual weapon designs as currency opened on
August 14, 2013. According to Eric Yu, the makers of CS:GO, Valve,
introduced the “Arms Deal Update.”30 The update allowed players the
ability to obtain locked crates, while playing the game, that could be
unlocked by purchasing a key from a company-operated store.31 Inside
the crate were “decorative weapons skins,” that could be bought, sold,
traded, and gambled.32 Yu noted that the website CS:GO Lounge was
the first to allow users to bet the skins they obtained on a game played
by professional players.33 Yu noted that as CS:GO Lounge grew in

25. Blake Robins, The Esports Landscape—July 2016, MEDIUM (July 21, 2016),
https://medium.com/ludlow-ventures/the-esports-landscape-july-20162350655dfa63#.em98ry1u7. See also John Gaudiosi, Big brands gravitating towards eSports,
FORTUNE (July 24, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/24/esports-sponsors/.
Traditional sports leagues such as the NBA have begun to launch their own esports leagues,
which is coupled with various ownership stakes held by players, and owners in different
esports entities. See Jacob Wolf, The NBA and Esports: How We Got Here, ESPN (Feb. 17,
2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/18702213/the-nba-esports-how-got-here.
26. Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State Regulation, and the
Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 28 (2015). Various estimates of the size
of the sports gambling industry estimate that upwards of several hundred billion dollars are
wagered annually in legal and illegal markets. Id.
27. Robins supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. Id. Robins notes that there are third-party sites which allow users to exchange virtual
items for real currency. Id.
30. Eric ‘Xenon’ Yu, The Start Of It All: Skin Gambling, UNIKRN (July 15, 2016),
https://unikrn.com/news/the-start-of-it-all/.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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prominence the popularity of professional matches also rose.34 The
amount of money that flowed into the skin betting industry created an
opportunity for the website OPSkins to operate as a form of foreign
exchange facilitator.35 OPSkins worked like a variety of other peer to
peer merchants using PayPal to facilitate the delivery of useable realworld currency to sellers upon completion of a transaction. 36 The
facilitation of a reliable means of extracting useable currency for skins
led opportunists to create a variety of additional gambling
opportunities for holders of skins, including casino style gambling
replete with roulette, poker, dice rolling, and coin flipping, where
transactions were facilitated almost exclusively in CS:GO skins.37
Brautigam noted that the August 2013 release of weapons skins
was quickly followed by the rise of a potentially illicit gambling
market.38 Brautigram found that the launch of CS:GO weapons skins
and the blossoming gambling market correlated to a three-fold rise in
professional tournament prize money, a doubling of the number of
tournaments, and an additional $1,000 in average per professional
player monthly earnings.39 Silverman noted that the CS:GO gambling
industry was valued at $7.4 billion in July 2016, but future valuations
were uncertain following efforts by Valve to crack down on gambling
sites after the initiation of two class action lawsuits.40
II.

MCLEOD AND REED LAWSUITS

Michael McLeod was the first to bring suit against CS:GO game
developer Valve, filing his complaint in the District of Connecticut on
June 23, 2016.41 The amended complaint alleged that Valve
“knowingly allowed, supported, and/or sponsored illegal gambling,”
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Yu, supra note 30.
37. Id.
38. Thiemo Brautigam, Valve’s Skin Gambling Ban and How It Affects the eSports
Industry, ESPORTS OBSERVER (July 15, 2016), http://esportsobserver.com/valves-skingambling-ban-and-how-it-affects-the-esports-industry/.
39. Id.
40. Robert Silverman, Video Game Gambling Just Took A Huge Hit, VOCATIV (July 14,
2016, 12:23 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/340492/video-game-gambling-just-took-a-hugehit/.
41. Class Action Compl.. McLeod, et al v. Valve Corporation, (D.Ct. filed June 23, 2016)
(3:16-cv-01018-AWT), 2016 WL 3449545 (D.Conn.) On June 28, McLeod filed an Amended
Class Action Compl., McLeod v. Valve Corporation, (D.Ct. filed June 28, 2016) (3:16-cv01018-AWT).
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by enabling user accounts to be linked to gambling websites.42 McLeod
argued that because Valve creates the skins, the company has the
ability to control the value of skins, but unlike the traditional model of
a casino there is no cost to Valve.43 McLeod alleges that Valve is aware
that a portion of its consumers are minors, including himself, and by
virtue of being under eighteen years old he lacked capacity to enter
into a contract thereby voiding Valve’s arbitration clause.44 McLeod
sought restitution by virtue of a Connecticut statute that “renders all
contracts for gambling null and void.”45 McLeod’s second contractual
claim asserted the defendants have unjustly enriched and should be
disgorged of their profits.46 The third count in McLeod’s complaint
alleged violation of the Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute.47 The final count of the complaint alleged that
the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices under
Connecticut law.48
A second lawsuit against Valve was filed by Jayme Reed in New
Jersey District Court on July 7, 2016.49 Reed alleged that, as a minor,
Valve’s arbitration agreement is non-binding allowing him to proceed
in federal court.50 The first four counts of Reed’s complaint were the
New Jersey equivalents of McLeod’s allegations; however, Reed
added two additional counts both labelled Count V and a related count
labelled VI.51 The first Count V in the Reed complaint alleged that it
was unlawful to receive “income derived, directly or indirectly, from
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt…”52 The two additional claims advanced by Reed had origins in
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 23-24. Mandatory arbitration clauses and clauses prohibiting the initiation of
class actions were upheld in American Express et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, and have
been viewed as potential barriers to litigation in the daily fantasy sports realm. 133 S.Ct. 2304
(2013); see Alison Frankel, Can Fantasy Sports Players Evade Arbitration in Case v.
FanDuel, DraftKings?, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2015/10/09/can-fantasy-sports-players-evade-arbitration-in-case-v-fandueldraftkings/.
45. Id. at 28 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-553).
46. Id. at 29-30.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Id. at 39 (citing Ct. Gen. Stat §§ 42-110A-42110B).
49. See Class Action Complaint Reed v. Valve Corp., (D. N.J. filed July 7, 2016) (2:16cv-04099-ES-JAD), 2016 WL 3672054 (D.N.J.).
50. Id. at 31.
51. Id. at 49, 51—2. It appears as though the Complaint erroneously labeled two counts
as V.
52. Id. at 49 citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1.
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New Jersey consumer protection statutes.53 On the same day Reed filed
his lawsuit, another federal class action (amended) complaint was filed
in the Southern District of Florida, in which a mother (C.B.) sued
Valve and others on behalf of her minor son and a related class,
outlining similar counts to the McLeod and Reed suits.54
The fourth major lawsuit against Valve was filed on August 4,
2016 in the Western District of Washington.55 The complaint was filed
by McLeod, who had originally filed in Connecticut.56 In the complaint
McLeod compared Valve to a:
barkeeper who allows illegal gambling operators to set up shop in
its backroom and sell chips for a fee to customers on their way in, and
allows another person to cash customers out inside the bar. Valve had
the power to prevent the gambling operators from setting up shop,
chose not to stop them and in fact gave them the keys to the
backroom.57
In addition to various claims present in the previously filed
complaints, the Western Washington McLeod complaint alleged
violations of more than 150 state gambling laws including at least one
violation from every state.58 The allegations contained within the
Western Washington complaint argue that Valve was complicit in the
facilitation of a market place that was devoid of regulation and rampant
with unfair contests, corruption, and received substantial benefit from
minors.59
Morrison observed that “CSGO has a gambling problem.”60 The
controversy highlighted by the McLeod and Reed lawsuits surrounds
the less-than transparent skins gambling industry. Morrison noted that
the legal complexity of skin betting is partially driven by the fact that
users do not actually own the skins, instead, users are purchasing a

53. Id. at 51-55.
54. Amended Class Action Complaint, C.B. v. Valve Corp., (S.D. Fla. Filed July 7, 2016),
0:16-cv-61561-BB, 2016 WL 3565991.
55. Class Action Complaint, McLeod v. Valve Corp., (W.D. Wash. Filed Aug. 4, 2016)
2:16-cv-01227-JCC.
56. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 41.
57. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 54, at 8.
58. Id. at 56-60.
59. See generally id.
60. Angus Morrison, Esports Lawyers Dissect CSGO Gambling in Reddit AMA, PC
GAMER (July 6, 2016), http://www.pcgamer.com/esports-lawyers-dissect-csgo-gambling-inreddit-ama/.
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license to use the skins.61 Bright noted that the relationship between
Valve and gambling sites is co-dependent.62 The gambling websites
exist because Valve has built the Application Program Interfaces
(APIs) in a manner that allows users to grant access to third-parties.63
Bright noted that the skins in some games provide nothing more than
a surface level change, not a competitive advantage.64 In the wake of
the McLeod and Reed lawsuits, Valve sent twenty-three skin gambling
sites cease and desist letters on or around July 20, 2016.65 The letter
purportedly stated:
Dear Sirs:
Re: Violations of Steam Subscriber Agreement
We are aware that you are operating one of the
gambling sites listed below. You are using Steam
accounts to conduct this business. Your use of Steam is
subject to the terms of the Steam Subscriber Agreement
(“SSA”),
http://store.steampowered.com/subscriber_agreement/.
Under the SSA Steam and Steam services are licensed
for personal, non-commercial use only. Your
commercial use of Steam accounts is unlicensed and in
violation of the SSA. You should immediately cease
and desist further use of your Steam accounts for any
commercial purpose. If you fail to do this within ten
(10) days Valve will pursue all available remedies
including without limitation terminating your accounts.
Karl Quackenbush
General Counsel, Valve Corp.66

61. Id. See also Bryce Blum, Opinion: Can Valve Realign the Ecosystem of Esports
Gambling? ESPN (July 15, 2016), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/17078888/valverealign-ecosystem-esports-gambling; Bryce Blum, Betting and Esports: The Crossroads,
UNIKRN (July 5, 2016), https://unikrn.com/news/betting-and-esports-the-crossroads/; Bryce
Blum, How Gambling Can be Good for Esports, THE DAILY DOT (June 3, 2015, 2:43 PM),
http://www.dailydot.com/esports/gambling-esports-benefits/.
62. Peter Bright, Valve Can’t Pass Buck to Third Parties for Teaching CS:GO Kids to
Gamble,
ARS
TECHNICA
(July
12,
2016,
12:20
PM),
http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/07/valve-cant-pass-buck-to-third-parties-for-teachingcsgo-kids-to-gamble/.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Chris Grove, 23 Skin Gambling Sites, Spanning Casino and Sports Betting, Targeted
with Cease and Desist From Valve, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 19, 2016, 9:14 PM),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/valve-skin-betting-cease-desist/.
66. Id.
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Grove noted that the cease and desist letter was sent to most of
the prominent skin betting companies across a variety of skin betting
types.67 Several days after Valve sent the cease and desist letter, the
industry website eSports Betting Report noted that while some
gambling sites announced their intent to comply with the Valve letter’s
demands, others continued operating as normal, with some
affirmatively stating that they would continue to operate without
regard to the Quackenbush letter.68
Gambling Compliance noted that Valve’s cease and desist letter
was widely praised by those who see potential in esports growth.69 It
was noted that the use of gambling sites by minors, as well as
illegitimate sites had the potential to attract unwanted regulatory
attention to an industry that is still nascent in North America. 70 The
announcement by Valve, and subsequent cease and desist letters,
raised a number of questions for the industry.71 The reasons behind the
willingness of Valve and other companies to distance themselves from
the ancillary gambling businesses, including the cash-based
sportsbooks that have arguably added to the company’s profit margins,
are not clear.72 A story that has emerged from the skin gambling
crackdown includes reports of individuals losing large sums of money
and of children who allegedly became addicted to skin gambling
sites.73
67. Id. (noting that there had been speculation that Valve may specifically target a type
of betting operator (e.g. casino style or peer-to-peer), but that speculation was unfounded).
68. Will Green, How The 23 Named Skin Gambling Sites Have Reacted to Valve’s Cease
And Desist Letter, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 22, 2016, 8:01 AM),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/skin-gambling-sites-status-valve-cease-and-desist/.
69. See David Altaner & Chris Sieroty, Skins-Betting Crackdown Cheers Legitimate ESports Operators, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (July 22, 2016).
70. Id.
71. See Dustin Gouker, End of the Skin Betting World As We Know It? Valve Cuts Off
CS:GO In-Game Wagering, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 13, 2016, 2:36 PM),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/valve-cuts-off-skin-betting/.
72. Will Green, Seven Questions Raised by Valve’s Skin Betting Announcement, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (July 16, 2016, 7:34 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/10739/valve-skinbetting-unregulated-esports-gambling-announcement-questions/.
73. Colin Campbell, The True Cost of Counter-Strike Skin Gambling, POLYGON (July 18,
2016),
http://www.polygon.com/features/2016/7/18/12203534/counter-strike-cs-go-skingambling, (stating that the early reports of gambling by youth, and addiction have featured
prominently in numerous other debates surrounding online gambling); see also Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act of 2006 Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, of the H. Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 4777, 110 Cong. (Apr. 5, 2006),
(noting that Representative McCollum, in a 1998 internet gambling hearing, when discussing
the level of skill required to be successful at fantasy sports and explaining to the hearing that
he is familiar with fantasy sports, stated: “my kids do that with little games they plug into the
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The question of what happens to the esports betting market
following the cease and desist letters sent by Valve is one that remains
unanswered. Grove noted that the answer may be contingent on how
serious Valve is with enforcing their prohibition, noting that “[a]s long
as items can be moved from one account to another, the potential for a
gambling product enabled by that transferability remains intact.” 74
Grove also observed that the shutdown of gambling sites may not be
orderly and some sites may not refund, or allow players the ability to
liquidate their accounts potentially adding to the possibility that
regulators may become involved.75 Perhaps the one given, as noted by
Grove and proven by the prohibition on sports betting, is that
restrictions and proclamations against gambling do little to deter those
who enjoy the activity.76
III.

THE INDUSTRY SCANDALS

Valve’s crackdown on skin gambling sites came in the wake of
revelations that two professional players had been linked to a skin
video machines.”) See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, Hearing on H.R. 2380
before the subcomm. on Crime of the H. Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (Comments of
Rep. Bill McCollum) at 116. Former NFL player Reggie Williams testified to the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1990 that if sports gambling were legalized children would collect
lottery tickets instead of baseball cards. See also Legis. Prohibiting State Lotteries from
Misappropriating Professional Sports Service Marks, Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1772, 101st Cong.
(1990) (Statement of Reggie Williams) at 24.
74. See Chris Grove, Where ESports Betting Goes Following Valve’s Crackdown On
Skin
Gambling,
ESPORTS
BETTING
REP.
(July
14,
2016,
12:32PM),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/valve-skin-gambling-crackdown-analysis/. See also
Will Green, How One Esports Gambling Site Still Offers Skin Betting Despite Order to Stop,
ESPORTS BETTING REP. (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/csgofasteludes-skin-bettingcrackdown/?utm_content=buffer625c3&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&ut
m_campaign=buffer (noting that more than one month after the Valve cease and desist letter
of July 19, 2016 at least one site was still offering skin betting).
75. Id.
76. Id. See also Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Gambling In The United States,
2-14
(1999),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/ngiscfrr.pdfhttp://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/ngisc-frr.pdf (stating that the 1999
Commission’s recommendations included a somewhat prophetic note on gambling
“…brought about by… greater accessibility, technological advances and increasingly
sophisticated games…” The recommendations encouraged research that “… would examine
not only the general population, but also sizable subgroups such as youth, women, the elderly
and minority gamblers…”). See also Complaint, British Telecomms. PLC v. Valve Corp.,
No. 1:11-CV-01249 (D. Del. July 28, 2016) (Valve has also been sued by British
Telecommunications (“BT”), who are represented by law firm Proskauer Rose, which has also
represented nearly every major American professional sports league. The BT complaint
alleged that various features of Valve’s steam platform infringe on BT patents).
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gambling site.77 One of the lawyers suing Valve posited that Valve is
complicit in the growth of the gambling market by virtue of their
development of API that can be accessed by third-party sites.78 The
link between professional players and gambling sites may have been a
tipping point, however, as several other problems with esports were
identified by an Electronic Arts executive who noted that match-fixing
and the use of performance enhancing drugs are problems that are
present in the industry.79
The relationship between CS:GO professionals and gambling
sites gained scrutiny when it was revealed that Moe Assad, a
professional in a contract with the gambling site CSGO Diamonds, had
received proprietary information in order to maximize the suspense for
his online streaming.80 Both Assad and CSGO Diamonds
acknowledged that Assad was provided with secret information that
according to Assad provided him with an advantage in CSGO
Diamonds dice roll games.81 The relationship soured publicly and it
was reported that Assad received the equivalent of $112,000 in
severance.82 While the Assad case may appear to be an outlier, there
have been various other reports of fixing actual CS:GO games and
skins-fueled online casinos.83

77. Rich McCormick, Valve Cracks Down on Gambling Sites After Accusations of
Profiteering,
THE
VERGE
(July
14,
2016,
3:18
AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2016/7/14/12186584/valve-gambling-statement-counter-strike.
78. Brian Crecente, Lawyer: Valve’s Silence While Helping Gambling Sites is
‘Unconscionable.’,
POLYGON
(July
6,
2016,
3:15
PM),
http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/6/12109022/valve-csgo-lawsuit-interview.
79. Darryn Bonthuys, EA’s Peter Moore talks Match-Fixing, Drugs and Diversity in
ESports, LAZYGAMER.NET (July 4, 2016), http://www.lazygamer.net/esports/eas-peter-mooretalks-match-fixing-drugs-diversity-esports/.
80. Charlie Hall, How One Pro CS:GO Player Profited from Gambling, and How It All
Went
Terribly
Wrong,
POLYGON
(July
14,
2016,
2:00
PM),
http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/14/12188372/how-one-professional-csgo-player-profitedfrom-gambling-and-how-it-all-went-terribly-wrong.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Yu supra note 30 (stating that “Throws” are referred to as the act of intentionally
losing a match, a means for some professionals to receive additional compensation. Yu noted
that following a scandal involving a prominent professional esports team, iBUYPOWER,
throwing was prohibited; however, the practice is allegedly still common with online forums
acting as the location for organizing “throws.”). See also Richard Lewis, New Evidence Points
to Match-Fixing at Highest Level of American Counter-Strike, THE DAILY DOT (Jan. 16, 2015
5:03PM), http://www.dailydot.com/esports/match-fixing-counter-strike-ibuypower-netcodeguides/. See generally William K. Black, The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One
(University of Texas Press, 2005). William Black therein posits that manipulation is the key
skill of a “control fraud,” a company a criminal utilizes as protection and shielding illegal
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An additional controversy emerged when esports personality
James “PhantomL0rd” Varga did not disclose his ownership of the
gambling site CS:GO Shuffle.84 The investigation into Varga revealed
that he had requested the website programmer to increase the
percentage of dice rolls that he would win on his site.85 Barlowe noted
that the Varga scandal came less than a month after two other players
were noted as failing to disclose their ownership of the site CSGO
Lotto.86 The scandals may have prompted the cease and desist letters
from Valve; however, given the unregulated nature of the skin
gambling market, it is possible that the Assad and Varga scandals are
simply the surface of the underbelly of the marketplace.
Grove and Krejcik categorized three prominent types of esports
gambling products: sportsbook wagering, fantasy esports, and
wagering utilizing in-game items.87 Sportsbook style wagering is
similar to traditional conceptualizations of sports betting, though
sportsbooks feature predominantly against the house Las Vegas style
wagering versus the popular peer-to-peer wagering on sites such as
Betfair.88 Eilers estimated that in 2015 greater than 60% of sportsbook
wagering took place in Asian markets.89 Daily fantasy esports are
offered by both esports specific operators, Vulcan and AlphaDraft, as
well as a variety of mid-level companies in the daily fantasy sports
space.90 The daily fantasy esports market is substantially concentrated
in North America, with an estimated 84 percent of revenue originating
from Canada and the United States in 2015.91 While both esports
sportsbook wagering and daily fantasy esports are closely associated
with popular forms of sports gambling, the third category of esports
action. This manipulation is inherent in complex systems such as banking and financial
transactions, particularly when control frauds gain political power and influence efforts to
regulate, collect data, and investigate corruption, As per the classic contemporary example of
industry (and regulatory) inaction leading to corruption, the post-2008 financial crisis, one
readily observes how a key industry influence in the form of a first-mover (Salomon Brothers,
Bear Stearns,) maintaining its competitive advantage through integration (bonds-securities,
derivatives/CDOs, here: skins gaming/trading) and eventual defensive inaction, may indulge
in the institutionalization of corrupt practice due to profit margins growth.
84. Katie Barlowe, Skins-Betting Rocked by New Controversy, Rigged Games Alleged,
CASINO.ORG (July 19, 2016), https://www.casino.org/news/skin-betting-rocked-newcontroversy-rigged-games-alleged.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Grove & Krejcik, supra note 7.
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 11.
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wagering bears little resemblance to the other two. Wagering using ingame items as currency is the largest segment of the esports wagering
market with an estimated handle of $2.28 billion in 2015.92 The largest
segment of esports betting is primarily confined to the games CS:GO
and DOTA 2 due to in-game APIs that allow players to transfer items
in marketplaces external to the games themselves.93 In addition to these
three means of wagering, certain sites also offer the ability for two
players to play against one another for money in addition to social
esports gambling and private bookmaking operations.94
Within the third realm of esports wagering, skin-betting is a
virtual cornucopia of nearly every available form of gambling.95 Grove
notes that skins can be thought of like casino chips.96 When users
deposit a skin they receive site credits that enable them to participate
in a variety of gambling contests including: sports betting, virtual coin
flips, virtual dice rolls, roulette and other casino style games.97 If the
users win, they are typically paid in skins with which they can either
continue gambling, attempt to trade on a secondary marketplace, use
the skins in game, sell for additional credits, or sell for cash through an
unaffiliated third-party foreign exchange-type site.98 While the virtual
currency aspect of the skins marketplace may represent a potential
legal obstacle, in the United States esports wagering legal liability may
be largely determined by whether esports are considered a sport.99
The question of whether esports constitute a sport, as a matter of
law, is more than an esoteric classification exercise.100 The decision to
term the activity of competitive video game playing “esports” is
unlikely to be dispositive of a judicial determination as to whether the

92. Grove & Krejcik, supra note 7 at 12.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 13.
95. See Chris Grove, Online Betting in the United States, NARUS ADVISORS (May 2016).
96. Chris Grove, Understanding Skin Gambling, NARUS ADVISORS (2016),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/A-Guide-To-SkinGambling.pdf.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Id.
99. John T. Holden, et al., The Future is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and
Potential Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 46 (2017).
100. James Dator, This Chart Will Always Help You Answer ‘Is It a Sport?,’ SBNATION
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:43 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/lookit/2014/8/19/6044393/is-it-asport-chart-nascar-bowling-ultimate-frisbee, (stating that a 2014 Reddit poll widely circulated
on the internet reported that of selected responses, boxing was most frequently cited as
constituting a sport, whereas chess, competitive eating and poker ranked in the bottom three).
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activities constitute sports.101 Indeed, while the sport moniker in esports
may draw an association amongst some individuals with baseball,
basketball or perhaps NASCAR, there are several potential distinct
disadvantages associated with esports being considered a sport from
the legal perspective.102 Additionally, the absence of a finding that
competitive video game playing constitutes a sport could invoke
additional concerns involving separate regulations.103
The status of esports as a sport is uncertain. In addition to the
colloquial uncertainty as to the status of the activity, there is equal
uncertainty as to which factors determine what classifies an activity as
a sport.104 While Reddit polls and casual conversations may appear to
be the extent of the importance of the debate over esports as a sport,
the classification of the activity may well be determinative of the
liability facing esports operators in the United States. The following
section will discuss the growing exposure of esports to various U.S.
gambling statutes and various international approaches to the
regulation of esports.105

101. See Why Fantasy Sports is Not Gambling, FSTA.ORG, http://fsta.org/research/whyfantasy-sports-is-not-gambling/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016), (arguing fervently that the daily
version of fantasy contests was distinct from sports gambling because it was more similar to
the season long version of fantasy sports, which were often conceived of as benign. The
industry proclaimed that daily variety fantasy sports were distinct from gambling, in part
because of the industry’s compliance with an exemption in the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act, a law applicable to online payment processors). See also Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006), (stating that despite the seemingly
obscure exemption, a variety of state Attorney Generals concluded that daily fantasy sports
constituted gambling). See also Dustin Gouker, Attorney General Opinions on Daily Fantasy
Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP., http://www.legalsportsreport.com/state-legality-of-dfs/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2016).
102. For instance, in the United States various gambling statutes have a specific
application to sports gambling. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961) (Transmission of Wagering
Information); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1964) (Bribery in Sporting Contests); 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.
(1992) (Professional & Amateur Sports Protection Act).
103. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1964) (Prohibited Practices in Contests of Knowledge,
Skill, or Chance).
104. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating an example of the
complicated nature of classification of activities as sports).
105. Compare Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN:
CHALK (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfslegalization-tracker-all-50-states (stating that in the United States, esports may face challenges
similar to those of daily fantasy sports operators. The daily fantasy industry undertook a
meteoric rise in popular press, touting its product as a skill-based game distinct from traditional
bookmaker sports-betting. The industry even cited Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act of 2006 (UIGEA) as providing evidence that fantasy sports were recognized as widely
legal. However, overlooked or ignored, was the fact that UIGEA does not modify any existing
state or federal law. See 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006). The failure to recognize that state gaming
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RELEVANT U.S. STATUTES

The issue of whether esports are a sport is important because a
variety of statutes have special applicability to sport. In the event that
esports are deemed a sport, then sport-specific federal statutes such as
the Wire Act and Sports Bribery Act are potential threats to the
continued growth of the esports gambling market.106 A finding that
esports do not constitute a sport may raise separate concerns for
operators and participants, including the potential applicability of the
federal “Quiz Show Scandal” statute.107 In addition, there is a variety
of other federal and state statutes that pose potentially serious threats
to both the skin-betting market and the real-money esports betting
market.108
The Wire Act applies to those individuals “engaged in the
business of betting or wagering.”109 Passed in 1961, the Wire Act was
a key component of the Department of Justice’s war on organized
crime.110 The statute was prefaced as providing an added tool for
combatting the interstate nature of organized crime’s bookmaking
business that relied on the racing wire service to obtain fast reliable
information about horse racing results and sports scores.111 The Wire
Act specifically targets those entities operating gambling businesses
whereby the transmission of gambling information takes place
between inter-state jurisdictions where the gambling activity is not
permissible in one or both locations.112 While the Wire Act appears to
laws would likely be determinative of whether daily fantasy sports were legal has essentially
left daily fantasy operators to fight legislators on an individual state by state basis); with Daily
Fantasy Sports in 2015: The Rise and the October Fall, OnlineGambling.com (Dec. 29, 2015),
http://www.onlinegambling.com/news/2015/12/daily-fantasy-sports-in-2015-the-rise-andthe-october-fall/; and Don Van Natta Jr., Welcome to the Big Time, ESPN (Aug. 24, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/17374929/otl-investigates-implosion-dailyfantasy-sports-leaders-draftkings-fanduel.
106. See, e.g., Transmission of Wagering Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961). See also
Bribery in Sporting Contests, 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1964).
107. See Prohibited Practices in Contests of Knowledge, Skill, or Chance, 47 U.S.C. § 509
(1964).
108. See, e.g., Prohibition of Illegal Gambling Businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970); see
also e.g. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701 – 3704 (1992).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961); see also Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, “The
Business of Betting or Wagering”: A Unifying View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L.
REV. 445 (2008); see also DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION
AND THE INTERNET, University of Nevada Press 4 (2005).
110. See Hayes & Conigliaro supra note 108.
111. See Racing Wire Service, 5 STAN. L. REV. 493 (1953); see also Schwartz supra note
108.
112. Mark D. Lynch, Smart Money is on Prosecutions: Using the Federal Interstate Wire
Act to Prosecute Offshore Telephone Gambling Services, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 177
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encapsulate a broad range of activities beyond the casual bettor, the
statute has been found to only apply to “sporting event[s] or
contest[s].”113 Both the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded that in order for the
statute to be implicated, the infringing activity must involve an
underlying sporting event.114 In the event that esports are viewed by a
court as possessing the attributes of a “sporting event or contest,” then
gambling site operators and those who assist gambling site operators
may be liable under the Wire Act.
The Sports Bribery Act was necessitated by a growing number of
match-fixing scandals in the United States beginning with the 1919
World Series and perhaps culminating in 1951 when five scandals
rocked college basketball.115 The Sports Bribery Act has laid largely
dormant since its passage in 1964, with few high profile
prosecutions.116 While the statute has been used sparingly by federal
prosecutors, if esports were found to constitute a sport, instances of
coordinated bribery-fueled match-fixing could invoke the statute.117
(1999). Section 1084(a) of the Wire Act states:
“Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result
of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
Transmission of Wagering Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1961).
113. See In re Mastercard Intern. Inc., 313 F. 3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002); see additionally
VIRGINIA A. SEITZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., WHETHER PROPOSALS BY ILLINOIS AND NEW YORK TO
USE THE INTERNET AND OUT-OF-STATE TRANSACTION PROCESSORS TO SELL LOTTERY TICKETS
TO IN-STATE ADULTS VIOLATES THE WIRE ACT (Sep. 20, 2011).
114. See id.
115. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and
Economics Approach, 42 NKU L. REV. 453 (2015).; see also Ante Udovicic, Sports and
Gambling A Good Mix? Don’t Bet on It, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401, 424 (1998).
116. See Holden & Rodenberg supra note 115. Arguably the highest profile prosecution
under the statute involved James “Jimmy” Burke, who was convicted on testimony of Henry
Hill and portrayed by Robert DeNiro as Jimmy Conway in the 1990 film Goodfellas. See U.S.
v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); see also U.S. v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); see
also Henry Hill & Douglas Looney, How I Put the Fix In, Sports Illustrated, Feb. 16, 1981.
117. Section (a) of the Sports Bribery Act states:
“Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry into effect, or conspires with any
other person to carry into effect any scheme in commerce to influence, in any
way, by bribery any sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such
scheme is to influence by bribery that contest, shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”
18 U.S.C. § 224 (1964).

10_FINAL_HOLDEN (DO NOT DELETE)

254

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/6/2017 2:22 PM

[Vol. 32:236

Although the statute is limited to instances of bribery, it is possible
quid pro quo style orchestrated fixes, such as that involving the
purported iBUYPOWER fix, would be sufficient to invoke the
statute.118 Next to the federal Sports Bribery Act, a variety of state level
match-fixing statutes could potentially be invoked depending on the
particular fact pattern of a fixed match.
In addition to the Wire Act and the Sports Bribery Act, should
esports be considered a sport, esports gambling operators may need to
be concerned about the potential threats brought under the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992.119 The statute
has been the subject of litigation a limited number of times, and most
recently has involved the five major American sports entities suing
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.120 The statute has questionable
constitutional underpinnings; however, to date, no court has held that
the statute violates the Constitution.121 PASPA grants parallel
authority to certain sports organizations and the Department of Justice
to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling.122 PASPA has
been called a paradox because it seemingly constrains states from
taking sensible steps to protect consumers.123 If esports are a sport,
there could be additional industry complications in navigating and
existing within the confines of PASPA.
If esports are outside the traditional legal definition for sport, the
so-called Quiz Show scandal statute could apply to esports
broadcasting.124 Formally labeled “Prohibited Practices in Contests of
118. See Augranzeb Durrani, Match-fixing comes to the World of E-Sports, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/23/match-fixing-comes-to-the-world-of-esports/.
119. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (1992).
120. See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 82
U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. June 23, 2014) (No. 13-967); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n et
al. v. Christie, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Governor Christoper J. Christie
et al. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 16-476, 16-477 (cert. granted Jun 27, 2017).
121. See Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., ‘Whose’ Game is It? Sports Wagering and Intellectual
Property, 60 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2014); see also Anastasios Kaburakis et al, Inevitable: Sports
Gambling, State Regulation, and the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. Online 27
(2015); see also John T. Holden et al., Sports Gambling Regulation and Your Grandfather
(Clause), 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1 (2014); see also Ryan M. Rodenberg & John
T. Holden, Sports Betting Has An Equal Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 1 (2017)
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (1992).
123. See Daily Fantasy Sports: Issues and Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. S. Comm.
On Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, 114th Cong. (2016) (written statement of Ryan M.
Rodenberg).
124. For a non-legal discussion of esports broadcasting, see Jesse C. Sell, E-Sports
Broadcasting (June 2015) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
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Knowledge, Skill, or Chance,”125 the federal statute was passed in the
wake of widespread fraud and deceit in several television “quiz show”
competitions dating back to the 1950s.126 As applied to any contest of
“knowledge, skill, or chance, the statute makes it unlawful:
for any person, with intent to deceive the listening or
viewing public—
(1) To supply to any contestant in a purportedly bona
fide contest of intellectual knowledge or intellectual
skill any special and secret assistance whereby the
outcome of such contest will be in whole or in part
prearranged or predetermined.
(2) By means of persuasion, bribery, intimidation, or
otherwise, to induce or cause any contestant in a
purportedly bona fide contest of intellectual knowledge
or intellectual skill to refrain in any manner from using
or displaying his knowledge or skill in such contest,
whereby the outcome thereof will be in whole or in part
prearranged or predetermined.
(3) To engage in any artifice or scheme for the purpose
of prearranging or predetermining in whole or in part
the outcome of a purportedly bona fide contest of
intellectual knowledge, intellectual skill, or chance.127
Esports are broadcast in two primary ways. First, traditional
networks such as ESPN or TBS have shown competitive video
gaming. Second, self-streaming platforms such as Twitch or YouTube
are hubs for esports viewers. The first category of esports broadcasting
almost certainly falls within the purview of the Quiz Show scandal
statute. The second category is less certain. Nevertheless, as esports
moves into mainstream media, incidents involving manipulation and
fraud that deceive viewers could be prosecuted under a statute
originally passed to regulate television shows six decades ago.
The Illegal Gambling Businesses Act of 1970 (IGBA) poses a
Technology)(on file with Comparative Media Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology).
125. 47 U.S.C. §509 (1964). See also, Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play: Anticipating
the Problem of Copyright Infringement in the New Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13
RUTGERS J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2015).
126. For a detailed discussion of the statute’s origins, see Kimberlianne Podlas, Primetime
Crimes: Are Reality Television Programs “Illegal Contests” in Violation of Federal Law, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 141, 141–72 (2007).
127. 47 U.S.C. § 509 (2012).
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potential threat to operators who meet three primary requirements: (i)
a predicate violation of state law; (ii) five or more people involved in
the operation of the business; (iii) and the business has operated on
“substantially continuous” basis for 30 days or has $2,000 in gross
revenue in a single day.128 The purpose of the statute was to supplement
the resources of state law enforcement, who may have faced
jurisdictional challenges in stopping large-scale gambling
operations.129 The broad liberties granted under the IGBA to the
Department of Justice allow the department to select the state in which
to prosecute; this would potentially allow prosecutors to select a
jurisdiction such as Washington State with very strict anti-gambling
laws as a venue to target a skin or real-money betting site that has not
excluded participation by residents of the state.130 The IGBA may
provide the federal government with a powerful tool to take action in
a jurisdiction with favorable laws if esports betting companies are not
careful to restrict access to customers in non-permissive states.
In addition to the IGBA, the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) may present concerns for esports
gambling sites and their payment processors.131 UIGEA prohibits
payment processors from facilitating payments to online wagering
companies.132 While the statute has most recently been the focus of
attention because it contains a limited exemption for certain fantasy
sports contests, it is unlikely that the exemption would apply to the
types of activities taking place in the majority of the skin casinos and
skin and real currency esports sportsbooks.133 It was reported that
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012).
129. See Kaitlyn Dunphy, Following Suit with the Second Circuit: Defining Gambling in
the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1310 (2014).
130. States have varying laws, governing the definition of gambling, ranging from
permissive to heavily restricted. The number of states recently analyzing their gambling
definitions has increased with the growth of the daily fantasy sports industry, whose meteoric
rise may be a cautionary tale for the emerging North American esports gambling market. See
Dustin Gouker, Attorney General Opinions on Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/state-legality-of-dfs/.
131. See 31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq. (2012).
132. Id.
133. The carve out in UIGEA for fantasy sports requires: (ix) participation in any fantasy
or simulation sports game or educational game or contest in which (if the game or contest
involves a team or teams) no fantasy or simulation sports team is based on the current
membership of an actual team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports
organization (as those terms are defined in section 3701 of title 28) and that meets the
following conditions:
(I) All prizes and awards offered to winning participants are established and
made known to the participants in advance of the game or contest and their value
is not determined by the number of participants or the amount of any fees paid
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PayPal instituted a policy that requires various esports tournament
operators to confirm that they are not operating as gambling sites; the
result has allegedly been a number of operators switching their
payment processing provider.134 The greatest threat that UIGEA likely
poses to esports gambling companies is the potential for payment
processors to withdraw their services thereby crippling the industry as
customers are unable to deposit or withdraw funds.
While federal gambling statutes appear to pose a specific threat
to various esports gambling providers, a variety of other statutes may
cause operators to be wary. There is the possibility that certain esports
gambling ventures may be violating provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform Act that prohibits the listing of certain event
contracts, which constitute gaming or are contrary to the public
interest.135 While there is limited case law on prohibited event
contracts, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
previously found that binary contracts on the outcomes of elections
would offend the statute.136 Additionally, statutes such as the federal
mail and wire fraud statutes are expansive and potentially criminalize
a wide variety of activities by virtue of some form of impropriety. 137
by those participants.
(II) All winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the
participants and are determined predominantly by accumulated statistical results
of the performance of individuals (athletes in the case of sports events) in
multiple real-world sporting or other events.
(III) No winning outcome is based—
(aa) on the score, point-spread, or any performance or performances of any single
real-world team or any combination of such teams; or
(bb) solely on any single performance of an individual athlete in any single realworld sporting or other event.
31 U.S.C. § 5362 (1)(E)(ix) (2012).
134. See Dustin Steiner, Paypal Lays Down the Law on ESports Payments, PVPLIVE (July
29, 2016), https://pvplive.net/c/paypal-lays-down-the-law-on-esports-payments. The daily
fantasy industry faced a challenge when payment processor Vantiv withdrew from processing
daily fantasy transactions following a growing list of states that viewed the activity as
constituting illegal gambling. See Joe Drape, Payment Processor to Stop Working with Daily
Fantasy
Sports
Clients,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/sports/draftkings-fanduel-vantiv-daily-fantasy.html.
135. See Order Prohibiting the Listing or Trading of Political Event Contracts, Commodity
Futures
Trading
Comm’n,
(Apr.
2,
2012),
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/nadexorder
040212.pdf.
136. Id.
137. For instance, the mail fraud statute states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
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Instances where esports gambling sites have failed to disclose conflicts
of interest in ownership or manipulate contests could potentially
invoke the powerful mail and/or wire fraud statutes.
At the state level, at least two categories of laws could attach in
the esports betting space. First, numerous states have anti-bookmaking
statutes. For example, Washington State regulators recently enforced
its bookmaking statute in the case of Betcha.com.138 Like some esports
betting portals, Betcha.com described itself as a “person to person
betting platform.”139 In a ruling with broad implications for operators
with a presence in the Evergreen State, the Washington Supreme Court
held that: “Because bookmaking alone may constitute professional

alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the
violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported,
transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially
declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012);
The federal wire fraud statute states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving
any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid
in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as
those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial
institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
138. Internet Cmty. & Entm’t Corp. v. Wash. St. Gambling Comm’n, 238 P.3d 1163, 1168
(Wash. 2010).
139. Id.
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gambling under the statute, we need not address whether Betcha or its
users were also engaged in ‘gambling’ as that term is defined.”140
Second, many states regulate or ban pooled money being used as
prize money for competitions. With many esports tournaments
featuring prize pools in the millions, the source of such pools could
implicate various state laws. While nascent esports pools have yet to
be scrutinized specifically, North Dakota,141 Massachusetts,142
Florida,143 and Nevada144 have all analyzed the legality of competition
payouts via prize money pools.
V.

FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS’ ESPORTS LAWS AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS

Internationally, various countries’ regulators have become aware
of the growth of esports and the emergence of consumer protection
issues arising out of a lack of oversight.145 Calvin noted that in the
United Kingdom, both the UK Gambling Commission and the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport have examined the
industry.146 Indeed, the UK Gambling Commission’s annual report for
2015/16 noted: “[t]he growing market in esports and computer gaming
has scope to present issues for regulation and player protection-issues
which are being examined by gambling regulators in other
international markets.”147 The UK Gambling Commission’s
recognition of esports gambling as an emerging gambling product
represents a substantial proactive step; however, as noted by Wood,
the UK is presently at the beginning stages of recognizing the potential
of the esports market.148 Wood further observed that the future
140. Id. at 1167.
141. Letter from Heidi Heitkamp, N.D. Att’y Gen., Letter Op. 94-L-298, to Andrew
Maragos, Rep., H.R. (Nov. 1, 1994).
142. MASS. GAMING COMM’N, White Paper on Daily Fantasy Sports (Jan. 11, 2016).
143. FLA. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 90-58 at 1(July 27,1990); FLA. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 91-03 at 1 (Jan.
8, 1991); FLA. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 94-72 at 1 (Aug. 23, 1994).
144. NEV. ATT’Y GEN. MEMO., LEGALITY OF DAILY FANTASY SPORTS UNDER NEVADA
LAW at 1 (Oct. 16, 2015).
145. See Alex Calvin, Does Esports Need Regulation?, THE MKT. FOR COMPUTER & VIDEO
GAMES (July 29, 2016, 11:57 AM), http://www.mcvuk.com/news/read/does-esports-needregulation/0170439.
146. Id.
147. Sarah Harrison, Annual Report & Financial Statements 2015/16, U.K. GAMBLING
COMMISSION at 11 (2016), http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/Annual-report-andaccounts-2015-16.pdf.
148. See Joss Wood, UK Gambling Commission: We’ll Work to Minimize Risks from
Emerging Esports Betting Markets, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 19, 2016),
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regulatory landscape of esports in the UK will likely involve input
from various private esports operators; however, these groups may
have competing interests.149 The UK Gambling Commission also
acknowledged that they had knowledge of skin betting and would take
action if British players were invited to gamble on licensed sites.150
While the UK attempts to decide how to regulate esports, France has
taken steps to create the France esports federation.151
In November 2015, France took preliminary steps to classify
esports as a sport.152 As the process is underway for the formal
recognition of esports under French law, the France esports federation
was launched as the representative voice of the national esports
community and as a “partner of the French National Olympic and
Sports Committee.”153 While the federation appears to provide a voice
to the French esports community, Auxent noted that the federation
possesses no power and is essentially a lobbying group.154 Kint and
Ledure observed that the French regulatory and legal framework needs
to provide clarity and protect against outside threats.155 Kint and Ledure
noted that without government clarification esports contests would be
classified as illegal lotteries under French law.156 In addition to the
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/uk-regulators-address-esports-betting/.
149. Id.
150. See Scott Longley, Skin Betting of Increasing Interest to UK Regulators, Operators,
and
Industry
Monitors,
ESPORTS
BETTING
REP.
(May
16,
2016),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/uk-considers-skin-betting-regulation/. Indeed, the Isle
of Man, a British Crown dependency, through its Gambling Supervision Commission has
amended gaming regulations to allow for skin betting. Joss Wood, Good News For Skin
Betting, As Isle of Man Amends Gaming Regulations to Allow It, ESPORTS BETTING REP (Feb.
21, 2017), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/isle-man-amends-gaming-regulations-allowskin-betting/.
151. Adrien Auxent, All You Need to Know About France’s New Esports Federation,
ESPORTS OBSERVER (Apr. 28, 2016), http://esportsobserver.com/need-know-frances-newesports-federation-france-esports/.
152. See Adrien Auxent, The French Government Recognizes Esports, but Who Gets to
Decide
What
Esports
Is?,
ESPORTS
OBSERVER
(Nov.
15,
2015),
http://esportsobserver.com/the-french-government-recognizes-esports-but-who-gets-todecide-what-esports-is/.
153. Auxent supra note 152.
154. Id.
155. See Arnaut Kint & Sebastien Ledure, Esports: The French Quest For A Legal
Framework, WORLD SPORTS L. REP. (July 2016).
156. France applies a strict test for determining whether an activity is a lottery, according
to Kint and Ledure the test involves: “(i) a public offer, (ii) hope of a gain, (iii) financial
contribution from players and (iv) presence of an element of hazard.” See id. As described by
Kint and Ledure, the definition of lottery in France appears to be the equivalent of the “any
chance” test, which is applied in a minority of U.S. jurisdictions, and is regarded as the most
stringent test for classifying an activity as not gambling, because even skill-based activities
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gambling connotation, the authors noted that absent government
oversight, professional esports players may not receive protections that
other professional athletes receive.157 The French Ministry of the
Economy and Finance released a report noting that France is the
world’s seventh largest esports market.158 The government report
recommended clarification on the noted lottery issue, in addition to
protection for children, and appropriate recognition for professional
players including a visa program to attract international players to
French competitions.159
While France and the UK progress towards regulation, the
country with the most developed esports infrastructure is South Korea,
regularly broadcasting esports on mainstream television.160 The South
Korean government formed the Korean Esports Association to oversee
the industry.161 Jung noted that the government support in South Korea
for esports coupled with cheap and widely available broadband
internet have been the two factors most important to the activity’s
growth in the country.162 The Korean Esports Association is embedded
within the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and
has the authority to license and regulate professional gamers, teams,
and certain businesses that are associated with esports broadcasting.163
While esports governance is most advanced in South Korea, the state
gambling monopoly does not offer esports betting, driving the practice
underground and contributing to the estimated $14-25 billion wagered
illegally each year.164
The Canadian province of Quebec, launched an esports betting
offering for the first time on August 11, 2016 through the provincial
possess some element of chance. Anthony Cabot, et al., Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the
Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill
and Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 393 (2008).
157. See Kint & Ledure, supra note 156.
158. See Rudy Sales & Jerome Durain, E-Sport La Practique Competitive Du Jeu Video,
MINISTERE DE L’ÉCONOMIE, DE L’INDUSTRIE ET DU NUMERIQUE at 2 (Mar. 2016).
159. Id. at 4.
160. See Jorge Albor, Why Korea Is Set to Dominate ‘Overwatch’ Esports, FANDOM (June
29, 2016), http://fandom.wikia.com/articles/korea-set-dominate-overwatch-esports.
161. See Paul Mozur, For South Korea, E-sports Is National Pastime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/technology/league-of-legends-south-koreaepicenter-esports.html?_r=0.
162. See Daniel Jung, Olswang on eSports: Lessons from South Korea, OLSWANG (Mar.
2, 2016), http://www.olswang.com/articles/2016/03/olswang-on-esports-lessons-from-southkorea/.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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lottery Loto-Quebec.165 Lottery administrators noted that there would
be future offerings on esports, marking an opportunity for Quebec
residents to gamble in an environment with clear regulation.166 Quebec
is the home of various online gambling providers, but the move to offer
esports betting in a regulated market is still progressive for a North
American market.167 Hincer noted that many of Canada’s gaming laws
are designed for land-based casinos and they may stifle technological
advances, while at the same time leaving individuals without sufficient
protection.168 The move by Quebec, however, comes at a time when a
Quebec government working group has suggested that all private
gambling sites should be available only through “a governmental
website/portal,” which would be the gate keeper allowing only those
private companies with appropriately issued licenses to be accessible
to residents.169
While countries such as the UK, France, Korea, and Canada
(Quebec) have begun exploring ways of regulating various
components of the esports industry and related gambling market, other
regions are choosing to ban the gambling aspects. For instance, the
government of South Australia announced its decision to ban esports
betting, citing concerns about the risk of children becoming addicted
to the activity.170 A variety of other countries have laws that could
potentially be implicated in esports betting and/or corruption. For
example, in China it is a criminal act to organize gambling activity,
165. See Joss
Wood, Regulated Esports Betting
Now
Available
from LotoQuebec, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/lotoquebec-esports-bettingservice/?utm_content=buffere66e9&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_ca
mpaign=buffer.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Ilkim Hincer, A World of Change, The Future of Gaming Regulation, CANADIAN
GAMING LAW. Summer 2016, at 8, 9.
169. See Johnny Jaswal, The Illegality of Current Gambling Laws in Canada and the
Vince Carter Trade – Views from the 6, CALVIN AYRE (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://calvinayre.com/2016/03/14/business/the-illegality-of-current-gambling-laws-incanada/. For additional discussion of online gambling in Canada see Ryan M. Rodenberg &
John T. Holden, A Sure Thing? Online Gaming and Canada, 3 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS
AND ENT. L. F. 98 (2013).
170. See Joss Wood, South Australia Gets Cold Feet About Esports Betting and Bans
It, ESPORTS BETTING
REP.
(Aug.
9,
2016,
6:48
AM),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/south-australia-prohibits-betting-esports/; see also John
Rau, New Frontier Against Problem Gambling, News Releases John Rau –Government of S.
Austl. (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.premier.sa.gov.au/index.php/john-rau-news-releases/970new-frontier-against-problem-gambling (noting that “[t]here is very little research on eSports’
betting and the potential dangers, especially to children and young people”).
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which may limit opportunities for individuals to wager.171 Germany has
relied on fraud statutes to prosecute those suspected of betting-related
match fixing and could potentially attempt to utilize the same statutes
to target esports match fixers.172 The classification of esports as a sport
would potentially implicate sport fraud statutes in the Italian penal
code that specifically apply to individuals who undertake to
manipulate a sporting event.173 The Criminal Code of Canada includes
a provision that prohibits cheating in betting where there is an intent to
defraud.174 In addition to the noted countries and specific statutory
provisions that may be applicable to combat corruption in esports, a
number of other countries rely on various fraud, bribery, and gambling
statutes that could be potentially implicated in the esports context.175
VI.

VIRTUAL CURRENCY

Moving forward, an important issue in attempting to determine
the proper regulatory approach to combating corruption in esports will
be what sort of treatment courts will afford the skins, which fuel the
skins gambling industry. While Bitcoin is the most visible and
prominent form of virtual currency, with transactions exceeding
$575,000,000 USD on a daily basis, other virtual items such as skins
are raising additional challenges for a banking and regulatory system
that is seemingly unprepared for a technological shift.176 The U.S.
Treasury has defined a virtual currency as “a medium of exchange that
operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all
the attributes of real currency.”177 Amongst the cited benefits of Bitcoin
and other virtual currencies such as Ether is the anonymity for users,
which has also likely caused some governments to ban the usergenerated currency.178 Other countries have taken different approaches,
such as the UK, which stated that Bitcoins are unregulated and subject

171. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Lone-Wolf Match-Fixing: Global Policy
Considerations, INT’L J. OF SPORT POL’Y & POL. 1, 6 (2016).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id; see also Criminal Code of Canada RSC 1985 Sec. 209.
175. See generally Holden & Rodenberg supra note 171.
176. For a background discussion of Bitcoin, see Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith,
Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L REV. 271 (2015).
177. See id. at 277 note 36 (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT
NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013)).
178. See Tu & Meredith, supra note 176.
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to value-added taxation.179
Greebel and others observed: “[r]ather than trying to stifle or
control virtual currencies, U.S. governmental entities recognize the
long-term value of virtual currencies and are trying to create a
regulatory regime to foster growth and development, and an
atmosphere where institutional and retail investors are protected.”180
Conversely, Tu and Meredith note that under U.S. federal law virtual
currency exists in something of a regulatory black hole.181 Two states,
Kansas and Texas, have issued pronouncements that virtual currencies
such as Bitcoin have no monetary value.182 A Florida Circuit Court has
similarly found that Bitcoins do not meet the statutory definitions of
monetary instrument for a money laundering conviction.183
Three U.S. federal courts have recently examined cases involving
virtual items. The first decision was issued by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland on October 20, 2015.184 In Mason, the court
ruled that the plaintiff’s virtual losses were not manifested in the realworld.185 The plaintiff played the mobile game Game of War (GoW).
In the game, there is a virtual casino where players can pay for spins
of a virtual wheel game in hopes of winning an in-game prize.186 The
plaintiff claimed that she lost approximately $100 in the GoW virtual
casino over the course of a year.187 The court held that by purchasing
spins of the GoW wheel with virtual gold “the plaintiff was not
wagering with dollars; she was playing with virtual gold (emphasis in
original).188 The gold purchased in the gold-store was issued for
entertainment purposes through a revocable license; however, the
court noted that while she could spend the gold in game she was not

179. Id. at 302.
180. Evan L. Greebel, et al., Recent key Bitcoin and virtual currency regulatory and law
enforcement developments, 16 J. OF INVESTMENT COMP. 13 (2015).
181. Tu & Meredith, supra note 176 at 306.
182. Id. at 308. Although as noted by Tu and Meredith, in perhaps some form of irony, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that Bitcoin is a form of currency,
and a scheme involving attempts to defraud individuals transacting in Bitcoin was subject to
the laws of the SEC. See id. at 309 citing SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416, 2013 WL
4028182, at 2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
183. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss the Information, State v.
Espinoza, No. F14-2923, 6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016).
184. See Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 2015).
185. Id. at 459.
186. Id. at 460.
187. Id. at 460.
188. Id. at 465.
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able to “cash out” in the game.189
The second virtual currency case originated in the Western
District of Washington.190 The plaintiff sought recovery under
Washington’s gambling loss recovery statute for losses suffered in the
virtual game Big Fish Casino.191 Visitors to the virtual casino can play
for, or purchase, additional chips to play games at the casino.192 Similar
to the plaintiff in Mason, the court noted that the plaintiff in Kater did
not suffer a loss of a “thing of value,” noting that the chips in the casino
cannot be exchanged for cash or merchandise, and therefore the
plaintiff’s claim was outside the scope of the Washington gambling
loss recovery statute.193 The plaintiff further argued that the chips could
be exchanged on the secondary market for cash and therefore are things
of value; however, the exchange violated the terms of use associated
with the game, and the court concluded that allowing a plaintiff to sue
based on the plaintiff’s own breach of contract “would be contrary to
basic principles of law and equity.”194
The third in the examined trilogy of virtual currency cases
originated in the North District of Illinois.195 The Double Down Casino
in Phillips operated similarly to the Big Fish Casino in Kater, with
users being able to play for free with virtual chips in a virtual casino,
but users also had the ability to purchase additional chips.196 The
Double Down chips could not be exchanged for cash, nor could they
be cashed out for physical items.197 While players could cash out their
chips through an unaffiliated Double Down market, such transfers
violate the game’s terms of service.198 The court noted that the plaintiff
was not a loser in the traditional gambling sense, because buying
virtual chips was only buying the right to continue playing the games,

189. Id.
190. See Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., No. C15-612 MJP, 2015 WL 9839755 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 19, 2015).
191. Id. at 1.
192. Id. at 1.
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. at 2, 4.
195. See Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, No. 15 C 04301, 2016 WL 1169522
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2016).
196. Id. at *4.
197. Id. at *5.
198. Id. Interestingly, while not allowing the exchange of virtual currency for physical
currency, the court notes that Double Down reported revenue of over $280 million in 2014,
which the court observed appears to be exclusively from the sale of virtual chips, id. at n.4.
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not a form of a wager.199 It is unclear how or if these three cases would
apply in the case of skin gambling, where the skin marketplace that
facilitates the transfer of virtual items is operated by the company who
manufactures the game.200 In the case of skin wagering, while Steam is
a subsidiary of Valve and operates the skins’ marketplace, it does not
operate the third-party skin-to-physical currency exchange.201
Internationally, there appears to be similar confusion as to what
status to afford virtual currencies, though the idea of denationalizing
money is not a new concept.202 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
acknowledges that the historical conceptualization of money, being
associated with the rights sovereign governments maintain to regulate
the mediums of exchange within their borders, does not fit with the
current emergence of virtual currencies.203 The IMF argues that
presently virtual currencies (VC) do not fulfill “the three economic
roles associated with money”: “(1) High price volatility of VCs limits
their ability to serve as a reliable store of value.”204 (2) “The current
small size and limited acceptance network of VCs significantly
restricts their use as a medium of exchange.”205 (3) “As of now, there
is little evidence that VCs are used as an independent unit of
account.”206 While the three factors cited by the IMF are not presently
demonstrable in virtual currencies, the market continues to evolve.
Additionally, the IMF does not bind any country or court; as such, to
deduce that skins or any other form of virtual currency are not the same
as physical currency would be ill-advised.
The question of whether skins constitute currency or are a
commodity may have different solutions in differing jurisdictions.
However, in contrast to the virtual casino cases, the Steam marketplace
seemingly acknowledges that skins may be bought and sold on the
marketplace, though funds cannot be withdrawn through the Steam

199. Id. at *9.
200. See Community Market, STEAM, https://steamcommunity.com/market/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2016).
201. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, SKINEXCHANGE, https://skinxchange.com/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
202. See DONG HE ET AL., VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS,
11 (2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf (noting Friedrich
Hayek proposed denationalizing in the 1970s).
203. Id. at 16.
204. Id. at 17.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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marketplace.207 From a public policy perspective, it is likely
undesirable to allow a highly regulated practice to flourish in an
opaque market. However, the challenges with applying real world laws
to virtual worlds is one that courts are likely going to have to address
for the foreseeable future.208
VII.

INTEGRITY SCANDALS

The biggest scandal in esports arguably unfolded in October
2015, when South Korean investigators arrested twelve people in
association with five fixed StarCraft 2 matches.209 The scandal
allegedly allowed the orchestrators to win $37,000 by exploiting the
illegal betting market through payments to three players.210 While
207. See
Community
Market
FAQ,
STEAM,
https://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=6088-UDXM-7214 (lasted visited Oct.
20, 2016).
208. See generally Jon M. Garon, Playing in the Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and
Identity Reconceptualized Through Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV.
465 (2008). Courts have been tasked with addressing virtual disputes since early in the
development of online gaming. For instance, in the early 2000s a group started a company that
employed unskilled laborers to sit at computers in Tijuana training and developing virtual
characters that could later be sold for up to $200. Julian Dibbell, Serfing the Web: Black Snow
Interactive and the World’s First Virtual Sweat Shop (January 2003),
http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/blacksnow.html. In response, the game operator Mythic
Entertainment banned the accounts associated with the characters being sold; this launched an
early discussion as to who is the rightful owner of virtual items. Id. Professor James
Grimmelmann noted that the online game Second Life allows users to purchase plots of land,
which can also be transferred amongst other game participants. James Grimmelmann, Virtual
World Feudalism, 118 YALE L. J. PKT. PART 126, 126-27 (2009). Virtual property in Second
Life was the subject of a 2007 lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The dispute arose when the plaintiff
acquired virtual land for below the virtual fair market value through what the game maker
termed an “exploit.” Id. at 597. The game maker subsequently suspended the plaintiff’s
account who then filed suit. Id. The parties would subsequently settle prior to a resolution on
the merits. See Second Life: Settlement in Bragg v. Linden, US LEGAL (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://blog.uslegal.com/2007/10/10/second-life-settlement-in-bragg-v-linden/.
209. Brendan Sinclair, 12 Arrested in Esports Match Fixing Scandal – Report,
GAMESINDUSTRY (Oct. 19, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2015-1019-12-arrested-in-esports-match-fixing-scandal-report.
210. Id. The gambling market is victimized in some match-fixing situations by virtue of
the fact that the market is theoretically meant to have a price set such that it attracts an equal
amount of bets (in monetary value) on each side of the wager, allowing the bookmaker to then
make money off the vigorish (a type of commission). In gambling-related match-fixing
situations the fixers typically are able to make bets at an attractive market price because the
odds reflect the bookmaker’s belief that the price is informed by the bookmakers’ expert
knowledge. Match-fixing creates a situation where the fixer is betting with non-public
information, or greater knowledge than the bookmaker, and therefore is able to exploit a
market price that does not reflect all information. For additional information on the structure
of gambling markets see Steven D. Levitt, Why Are Gambling Markets Organized So
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match fixing has resulted in some of the most prominent scandals to
affect esports, the industry has seen its share of growing pains with
other scandals including sexism, use of banned competitors, doping,
and agreements to split prize pools.211
The esports match-fixing scandals are becoming more prominent.
Durrani reported in April 2016 that twenty-one CS:GO players had
been accused of being complicit in match fixing dating back to 2015.212
Durrani observed that match fixing scandals have also rocked the game
community surrounding DOTA 2, noting that in 2013 a Russian player
threw a match in order to win a bet of $322; since that time, the number
322 has become synonymous with match-fixing in the industry.213
Richmond wrote that the pressures of short careers on esports
competitors may contribute to a willingness to manipulate the
outcomes of matches, observing that some esports athletes retire as
young as nineteen years old, and they have little opportunity to remain
involved in the activity following the end of their playing careers. 214
While match-fixing scandals involving players have become the focus
of recent attention, the practice is not confined directly to those
competing.215 MBC, a Korean esports broadcaster, undertook
modifying some game maps in the game Warcraft III in order to have
a more competitive competition.216 The in-game match-fixing scandals
have been exacerbated by a series of seemingly unbelievable scandals
in the esports gambling market.

Differently from Financial Markets, 114 ECON. J. 223 (2004).
211. See 5 Biggest Esports Scandals, BETMINDED (2016), http://www.betminded.com/5biggest-esports-scandals-27320.html; see also Kevin Loria, Some competitive video gamers
are abusing drugs to get an edge, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2016, 3:44 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/esports-doping-scandal-investigated-by-espns-otl-2016-1.
212. Aurangzeb Durrani, Match-Fixing Comes to the World of E-Sports, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/23/match-fixing-comes-to-the-world-of-esports/.
213. Id.
214. Ben Richmond, When it Comes to Gambling Scandals, Esports Are Just Like Regular
Sports, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 28, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/when-itcomes-to-gambling-scandals-esports-are-just-like-regular-sports.
215. Callum Leslie, M0E’s Future with Turner’s ELEAGUE in Doubt Amid Gambling
Scandal, THE DAILY DOT (June 20, 2016, 5:56 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/esports/m0egambling-eleague/.
216. Alex Whiteman, A Short History of Match-Fixing in Esports, ESPORTS BETS (May
10, 2016), http://www.esportsbets.com/2255/esports-match-fixing-prevalence-history/; see
also KidArtica, MBC Map Scandal Update, SK-GAMING (Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.skgaming.com/content/9111-MBC_Map_Scandal_Update; see also MBC Map Scandal,
TEAMLIQUID, http://wiki.teamliquid.net/warcraft/MBC_Map_Scandal (last modified June 30,
2016).
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Examples of recent scandals highlight issues of lack of
transparency on the part of gambling sites as well as potential conflicts
of interest. For example, CS:GO player “MoE” was sponsored by
casino style skin-betting site CS:GO Diamonds, and in exchange for
compensation, MoE would broadcast his gambling on the site. In a
related scandal, CS:GO Lotto, became embroiled in a scandal when it
was revealed that two popular esports professionals had an equity stake
in the site, which was not revealed in videos showing the players
winning on the site.217 These gambling sites lacked transparency and
expanded the scope of likely conflicts of interest within the industry.218
While corruption has plagued both the esports games themselves
and the integrity of the gambling market, the lack of central
governance may be condoning the use of performance enhancing
drugs. In January 2016, ESPN Outside the Lines ran a feature on the
doping problem currently emerging in esports.219 The drugs of choice
in esports are nootropics, or drugs designed to boost cognitive
function.220 Professional CS:GO player Kory “Semphis” Friesen was
quoted as saying “we are all on Adderall.”221 The doping scandal led to
esports league ESL implementing random drug screening of
competitors.222 ESL noted that it views doping as the equivalent to
other forms of cheating including match-fixing, and violators of the
league’s drug policy would receive equivalent punishments to other
forms of cheating.223 In April 2016, it was noted that no ESL player
217. See Leonardo Postrado, Youtube Esports Star Issues Non-Apology Over Skin Betting
Scandal, CALVIN AYRE (July 7, 2016), http://calvinayre.com/2016/07/07/business/youtubeesports-star-issues-non-apology-over-skin-betting-scandal/.
218. For a more detailed discussion of the MoE CS:GO Lotto affair see Will Green, Skin
Gambling Site CSGO Diamonds: We Told Sponsored Player In Advance When He Would Win,
ESPORTS BETTING REP. (June 13, 2016, 2:23 PM), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/csgodiamonds-skin-betting-m0e/.
219. See Kevin Loria, Some Competitive Video Gamers Are Abusing Drugs To Get An
Edge, TECHINSIDER (Jan. 15, 2016, 3:44 PM), http://www.techinsider.io/esports-dopingscandal-investigated-by-espns-otl-2016-1.
220. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Cognition Enhancing Drugs
(‘Nootropics’): Time to Include Coaches and Team Executives in Doping Tests? BRIT. J. OF
SPORTS MED. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/early/2016/01/25/bjsports-2015095474.full.
221. See Hugh Langley, Sex, Drugs and Counter-Strike: eSports is Fighting its Demons,
TECHRADAR (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/gaming/sex-drugs-andcounter-strike-esports-is-fighting-its-demons-1318109.
222. Evan Lahti, After Drug Scandal, ESL Says “Esports Needs to Mature,” PC GAMER
(July 24, 2015), http://www.pcgamer.com/after-drug-scandal-esl-says-esports-needs-tomature/.
223. Id. See also Rob Crossley, ESL Reveals Plan to Clean Up Doping, Corruption, and
Cheating in Esports, GAMESPOT (May, 13, 2016), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/esl-
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had yet returned a positive test.224 Langley wrote that amongst the
strategies to deter doping are contractual morals clauses that would
allow for termination of an individual caught doping from sponsorship
and playing contracts.225 While randomized drug testing may catch
some drug users, given the short time that the drug is detectable in an
individual’s system, it is likely that advanced doping regimes may be
able to defeat the testing programs.226
The corruption scandals facing the esports industry are similar to
those being faced by other sports. Both doping and match-fixing have
had a substantial impact on international sport.227 Similarly the
corruption facing the esports gambling industry is not unprecedented
nor is the growth of the gambling industry seemingly outpacing the
industry that supports it.228 The continued success of the esports
industry will likely require some form of overarching governance
across various titles capable of representing the interests of the industry
to various law making bodies. The idea of attempting to continue with
reactionary responses to scandals previously present in other sports
would not be viewed favorably by lawmakers, who will likely lack the
technical expertise to fully appreciate the intricacies of the industry.
Amongst the challenges with the international regulation and
governance of esports are several aspects. Firstly, the industry is still
in growth stages, there are presently a number of national and
international organizations that are competing for recognition;
however, to date no all-encompassing organization has emerged in the
form of Olympic-style governing bodies akin to other more traditional

reveals-plan-to-clean-up-doping-corruption-and/1100-6439781/.
224. See Langley, supra note 221. One of the critiques of various sports drug testing
programs is that “they were more like discipline tests, IQ tests. If you were careful and paid
attention, you could dope and be 99 percent certain that you would not get caught.” Henry
Abbott, The Gaps in NBA Drug Testing, ESPN (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://www.espn.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/51305/gaps-in-nba-drug-testing.
225. See Langley, supra note 221.
226. The presence of Adderall is estimated to be detectable in saliva (ESL uses oral swabs
for drug testing) for seventy-two hours. See Adderall and Drug Tests: What Drug Adderall
Really Comes Up As In A Test, HOME HEALTH TESTING (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.homehealthtesting.com/blog/2010/03/adderall-and-drug-tests-what-drugadderall-really-comes-up-as-in-a-test/. See James Pavisian, The Case for Human Ingenuity:
How Adderall has Sullied the Game, 48 WASHBURN L. J. 175, 205 (2008), for a discussion of
the benefits and drawbacks of salivary testing.
227. See generally DECLAN HILL, THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO MATCH-FIXING IN FOOTBALL
(2014), for a background discussion on the impact of match fixing.
228. See, e.g., Ryan M. Rodenberg & Anastasios Kaburakis, Legal and Corruption Issues
in Sports Gambling, 23 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 8 (2013).
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sports.229 Secondly, there is a challenge of attempting to put the
disruptive technologies of esports into the model that has traditionally
been used for sports. For instance, esports broadcasting is typically
encountered online through platforms such as Twitch and Youtube;
through these forums many different broadcasters can all be watching
and describing the same esports event allowing viewers to choose their
favorite broadcaster.230 This form of broadcasting changes one of the
more lucrative parts of traditional international sports competitions,
the national-level sale of broadcast rights. Thirdly, a challenge facing
the governance of esports is that game preference changes over time,
some games fall out of favor, and while this has happened with some
sports at the Olympics and other competitions, in esports the changes
appear magnified given the relatively recent emergence of the activity.
It is likely that once various countries show a sustained ability to
produce top level talent, then the feasibility of international
governance of the activities will become more stable; but at the
moment the industry is still in its initial stages of seeing where it fits
within existing models. The one aspect of the industry that appears to
clearly fit transnational models is corruption; gambling, match-fixing,
and doping. While it is uncertain how exactly esports will continue to
develop on an international stage, it is necessary that efforts to preempt
esports corruption begin with international cooperation, given the
portability and intangibility of the emerging gambling markets that
have fueled nefarious behavior.
CONCLUSION
Future regulation of the esports industry is inevitable if the games
are going to take the next step towards being recognized alongside
other more traditional sports.231 Various multinational groups are
attempting to move the esports industry towards better regulations. For
229. See Andrew Visnovsky, Growth of Esports: Regulatory Concerns, SPORTS INTEGRITY
INITIATIVE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/growth-of-esportsregulatory-concerns/
230. See Mary-Ann Russon, What is Twitch and How do I Make Money From It? IBTIMES
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/what-twitch-how-do-i-make-money-it-1435874.
231. See generally Robert Silverman, Why Regulating the Billion-dollar Esports World is
Nearly Impossible, THE WEEK (Aug. 16, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/635530/whyregulating-billiondollar-esports-world-nearly-impossible; Tricia Duryee, ESports Wagering
Estimated to Hit $23.5B by 2020, Generating Revenues of $1.8B Worldwide, GEEKWIRE (Sept.
9, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2015/esports-wagering-estimated-to-hit-235b-by-2020-generating-revenues-of-1-81b-worldwide/; Kane Fulton, The Beautiful Aim: Can
WESA
Fix
eSports?,
TECHRADER
(May
17,
2016),
http://www.techradar.com/news/gaming/the-beautiful-aim-can-wesa-fix-esports—1321511.
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example, the Esports Integrity Coalition has proposed various
standardized policies for esports leagues to adopt.232 Silverman
observed that as a non-profit startup the Esports Integrity Coalition
may not have the necessary resources to provide oversight to multiple
esports leagues.233 In addition to the Esports Integrity Coalition, there
is also the World Esports Association, supported by multiple
organizations with the objective of advocating on behalf of players,
though within two weeks of launching, FaZe Clan left the Association
citing a lack of transparency.234 Additionally, there is the World
Esports Council, which launched in 2015 and seeks to provide “an
overarching governing body.”235 In addition to multinational groups,
there are also groups that have been formed to specifically address
issues related to British and French esports industries.236
According to Green, regulation of the industry and appointment
of a unifying governing body may serve several functions for
advancing esports.237 Success of an overarching esports governance
structure will likely require a large number of organizations coming
together while delegating some rule making authority from their
respective organizations.238 However, the most important role that a
regulatory body may have is its advocacy to governments. 239 In
addition to demonstrating to lawmakers a sense of legitimacy, a
respected governing body with regulatory teeth may be able to assert
to lawmakers that the industry is capable of self-regulation and does
not require governmental intervention. While the future success of
esports will include numerous challenges, it has arguably survived to
make it to those future discussions, which is no small feat.240

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Will Green, Establishing Esports Oversight: The Groups, Issues, and Potential
Challenges,
ESPORTS
BETTING
REP.
(July
12,
2016,
7:13
PM),
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/esports-oversight-overview-and-challenges/.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. For examples of sports that failed to achieve mainstream popularity and failed sports
leagues see, e.g. Slamball, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slamball (last visited Jan.
31, 2017); Robert Wood, Universal Football, TOPEND SPORTS (2016),
http://www.topendsports.com/sport/extinct/universal-football.htm; Matt Crossman, A
Beautiful Corpse: An Oral History of the Fast Life and Quick Death of the XFL, SBNATION
(May 7, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/longform/2014/5/7/5683742/xfl-oral-history;
Lorenzo Arguello, 9 Ill-Conceived Pro-Sports Leagues That Went Down In Flames, BUSINESS
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INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/10-ill-conceived-prosports-leagues-that-went-down-in-flames-2012-2.; Robert Wood See List of Discontinued
Sports and Events of the Summer Olympics, TOPEND SPORTS (May 2016),
http://www.topendsports.com/events/discontinued/list.htm (listing sports that have been
played at the highest level before being discontinued).

